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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 15669 
Respondents, who were the plaintiffs below, brought 
this action in the district court for Summit County after the 
appellants, defendants below, barred access to respondents' 
property in wnite Pine Canyon. Appellants had erec~ed two 
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iron gates across the existing roadway in the canyon where the 
roadway crosses appellants' property which lies just above 
and below respondents' property in the canyon. The district 
court, Judge George E. Balli£, sitting without a jury, held 
that the roadway in the canyon is and has been, since before 
the turn of the century, a public road and enjoined appellants 
from further interference with the use of the roadway by 
respondents and the public. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The appellants are the successors in interest, as the 
grantees, of their father John Candas who, in an earlier lawsuit 
in 1928, was successful in establishing that the roadway in White 
Pine Canyon is a public road. The questions presented by the 
appeal are the following: 
l. Whether it was error to receive in evidence the 
testimony of deceased witnesses who testified for John Candas 
in the earlier case as to the public character of the roadway, 
where the transcript of the testimony in the earlier case has 
been lost and the only record of the testimony of the deceased 
witnesses is found in the Abstract on Appeal and in the brief of 
John Candas which were filed in this court in the earlier case? 
2. Whether the pleadings of John Candas in the earlier 
case, in which he alleged the public character of the roadway, 
were admissible in this case? 
-2-
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3. Whether appellants are judicially estopped, by 
the position of John Condas in the earlier case, from arguing 
that the roadway is a private road? 
4. Whether appellants are collaterally estopped, by 
the findings in the earlier case, from litigating in this case 
the public or private character of the roadway? 
5. Whether the evidence establishes that appellants' 
property, while part of the public domain, was subject to a 
public road which has not been vacated? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The follo1.;ing statutes are invol·Jed i:1 this ~ .,J_eeding: 
Revised statutes of the United States, § 2477 (43 U.C.A. 
§ 932): 
"The right of way for the consc:uction of 
high1.;ays over public lands, r.o: reserved for public 
uses, is hereby granted." 
l.!tah Code Annotated, § 27-12-89: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuouslv used as a public thoroughfare for a period 
of 10 years·." 
Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-90: 
"All public highways once established shall continue 
to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the 
highwav authorities having jurisdiction over any 
such hi;:;hi.Jay, or by other competent authority." 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background Of This Lawsuit. 
White Pine Canyon is situated about three m~les north-
west of Park City. The mouth of the canyon is at the end of a 
paved road known as Trottman Lane which turns off to the west 
from the highway to Park City south of Kimball's Junction. At the 
end of the lane is a dirt roadway which continues south across 
the properties of both parties to the top of the canyon. 
In 1924 John Candas, the appellants' father and his 
brother Pete Candas, the respondents' father, travelled to White 
Pine Canyon to talk to one Delbert Redden about his property 
which was situated near the mouth of the canyon. John Candas 
purchased the Redden property and then he and Pete and another 
brother homesteaded other lands farther up the canyon. (R. 500.) 
In 1927, John Candas was sued by his immediate neighbor, 
Patrick Sullivan, who owned the property just below John Candas at 
the mouth of the canyon. Sullivan charged John Candas with trespass 
as he drove his sheep along the roadway where it crossed the 
Sullivan property. The outcome of the lawsuit, about whict more 
will be said later, was in favor of John Candas. Sullivan 
v. Candas, 76 U. 585, 290 Pac. 954 (1928). 
The property homesteaded by Pete Candas lies just above 
the former Redden property and just below another parcel of land 
which John Candas later acquired. One cannot reach the respondents' 
-4-
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property from the bottom or from the top of the canyon without 
crossing the property acquired by John Condas and later conveyed to 
appellants. (R. 402-404, 504-525, 575-579; Pl. Ex. 1.) 
For many years and while John Condas was alive, Pete 
Condas and his family used the roadway in the canyon for access 
to their property. Then, in 1970, after John Condas had died and 
after Pete Condas turned down the appellants' proposal that Pete 
give them power to sell his property in conjunction with their 
property, appellants erected the two iron gates across the roadway 
with the result that respondents could not reach their property. 
(R. 517-521.) 
Appellants also asked the Summit County Cornoission to 
vacate a part of the "public road" which crossed their land, 
the former Redden property. (R. 977-983.) Acting on appellants' 
representation that no one else used the roadway (R. 983.), the 
Commission, without prior public notice, adopted an ~rdinance 
proporting to vacate part of the "public road" where it crosses 
the former Redden property, as appellants had requested. After 
learning of respondents' interest in the roadway and following 
consultation • ..;ith the Countv Attorney, the Commission concluded 
that its action in vacating the road was in error and a 
nullity. (R. 1002-1007, 1009-1010.) 
B. Resoondents' Position At The Trial. 
Respondents took the position that (l) the roadway became 
a public road by federal grant and public user long before John 
-5-
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and Pete Condas came to White Pine Canyon, (2) the Summit County 
ordinance purporting to vacate a part of the public road was a 
nullity for lack of notice and (3) if the roadway was not a public 
road, nevertheless they had a prescriptive right to use the roadway. 
On the creation of the public road in the early days 
respondents offered in evidence the pleadings of John Condas, 
the testimony of his witnesses and the findings of fact in the 
earlier Sullivan lawsuit. (R. 405, 422-435.) Respondents 
also offered in evidence the testimony of several men who were 
still alive who were able to testify as to early public use of 
the roadway before and after John Condas acquired the Redden 
property in 1924. The testimony of these men covered the years 
from 1903 to 1931. They testified that the public used the canyon 
for hunting, logging and trailing livestock and that public 
travel in the canyon was on foot and by horseback, by teams of 
horses pulling bobsleighs loaded with logs and by trucks and cars. 
(R. 478-497.) 
Appellants have not discussed in their brief respondents' 
evidence which was obtained from the Sullivan case. That evidence 
is summarized as follows: 
l. The pleadings of John Condas. In his answer and 
counterclaim John Condas plead that the roadway in White Pine 
Canyon was "* '" * a public highway and has been used ,., "· -'· by the 
public generally * * * for more than sixty years past. -'· " -'·" Para· 
graph 5 of John Condas counterclaim reads in full, as follows 
(Ex.2-P, pp. 17): 
-6-
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2. The testimony of John Condas' witnesses. Five 
persons who are no longer living testifiec for John Condas in the 
Sullivan case as to the public's use of the roadway. One of the 
witnesses was Mr. Redden from whom John Condas purchased the 
property appellants now occupy. Pertinent portions of that 
testimony, as set forth in the abstract prepared by Patrick 
Sullivan's lawyer in his appeal to this Court (Ex. 2-P), 
are set forth in the Appendix A to this brief. In every respect 
the accuracy of the abstracted testimony is verified by the 
verbatim quotat~ons of that testimony which are contained in 
John Condas' brief which was filed in this Court. (Ex. 3-P, p. 8.) 
3. Findings of fact. The findings of fact in the 
Sullivan case, as to the nature and extent of the public's use 
of the roadwav are in Finding ~o. 8, which reads as follows 
(Ex . .2-P, )'.-'+0. 
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8. The Court finds that more than fifty years 
ago the inhabitants of Park City, Snyderville and 
surrounding territory, and the public generally 
constructed and used a roadway up White Pine Canyon, 
through over and across Lot 8, Township 2 South 
Range 3 East, which lands now belong to the 
plaintiffs, [Sullivan property] and said roadway, 
as so constucted, was and has been, for more than 
fifty years last past, used by the public generally 
as a public highway, for the general purposes of 
traffic, including the hauling and transportation 
of logs, fire wood, lumber, mining timber, supplies 
for mining operations, and for the trailing of 
livestock, including cattle, sheep and horses, and 
for all purposes for which public highways, under 
similar conditions, are generally used. 
C. Appellants' Position At The Trial. 
Appellants confined their case to the testimony of 
themselves and others as to the physical condition of the roadway 
after the turn of the century and the efforts of John Condas to 
restrict traffic on the roadway by means of wooden gates which, 
from time to time, he placed across the roadway where it crosses 
the former Redden property. 
Appellants never attempted at any time to offer in 
evidence anything from the record of the Sullivan case. They 
never attempted to show that the position taken by John Condas, 
his witnesses and the district court in the Sullivan case was in 
error so far as the public ch<'racter of the roadway is concerned. 
In short, as to the public character of the roadway prior to 1924, 
appellants offered nothing at all. It was as though, from appellanCo 
point of view, the early history of the canyon had no significance 
D. The Trial Court's Decision In This Case. 
The trial court's findings of fact and its conclusions of 
of law are found at page 211 in the record on appeal anc.i are se( 
-8-
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forth in the Appendix B to this brief. In summary, the trial 
court found as follows: 
(1) The roadway in White Pine Canyon had been used 
by the public for more than 50 years prior to 1928. (Fdgs. 
3-4.) 
(2) John Candas took the position in the Sullivan 
case, that the roadway across his property was a public road. 
(Fdg. 6.) 
(3) The district court in Sullivan found the 
public's use of the roadway since 1873 to have been "openly, 
notoriously, continuously, uninterruptedly, adversly and 
under claim of right as a public road", and appell'lrts in 
this case offered no evidence to the contrary. (Fdg. 7 .8.) 
(4) John Condas, by gates and signs, sought to 
prevent the public's use of the roadway after 1925 (Fdgs. 
9-12) but the public continued to ..:s"' c:·.e roadway until 1971 
(Fdg. 5). 
(5) Respondents did not establish a prescriptive 
right of passage over the roadway. (Fdg. 14.) 
(6) Respondents are denied access to their property 
and the public is denied use of the roadway by reason of iron 
gates put up by appellants in 1971. (Fdg. 15 .) 
( 7) Hhen appellants asked the County Commission to 
vacate a portion of the road1vay on their land as a public 
road t:-:e\· represented to the Commission that no one but 
themselves use~ the roadway. (Fdg. 17 ) 
-9-
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(8) Notice of the vacation was not given to 
respondents or to the public. (Fdg. 18.) 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the 
roadway as it passes through and beyonu appellants' property in 
the canyon is a public road and that the Summit County ordinance 
proporting to vacate part of the road was null and void. (R. 215.) 
The trial court decreed that the roadway is a public 
road and enjoined appellants from interferring with the use of the 
road by respondents and the public. (R. 216-217.) The decree 
is reproduced as Appendix C to this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE FORMER TESTIMONY OF 
WITNESSES IN THE SULLIVAN 
CASE IS ADMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE 
The trial court received in evidence the former testi-
mony of persons who were witnesses for John Condas in Sullivan v. 
Condas and had testified in that case on the public's use of the 
roadway in White Pine Canyon. 
The rule of evidence involved is Rule 63(3), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which admits former testimony as an exception to the 
hearsay rule, on certain conditions. The rule reads in pertinent 
part as follows: 
(3) Depositions and Prior Testimony. Subject 
to the same limitations and objections as though the 
-10-
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declarant were testifyinf in person* * *: (b) if 
the judge finds that the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness at the hearing, testimony given as a 
witness in another action 1, * *, when (i) the testi-
mony is offered against a party who offered it in 
his own behalf on the former occasion, or against 
the successor i~ interest of such party, * * *· 
In this case the former testimony was offered on counsel's 
representation to the court that the former witnesses were no longer 
living. (R. 417.) Appellants did not object to the representation 
that the former witnesses were unavailable. The former testimony 
was offered against the appellants as the successors in interest 
as grantees, of the party, John Candas, who offered the testimony 
in his own behalf on the former occasion. The requirements of 
the rule were complied with in every detail. 
The rule does not require "reprocity" or "mutuality" 
in the sense that the party who offers the former testimony 
must also have been a party in the prior proceeding. It is only 
necessary that the testimony be offered against a party who offered 
it before or his successors in interest. Placing substance over 
form, the Utah rule recognizes "that it is only the party against 
whom the former testimony is nm• offered, whose presence as a 
party in the previous suit is significant." McCormick On Evidence, 
2d ed., § 256 at p. 618. 
Although subpart (b) (i) of the rule does not require the 
identity of issues for which appellants argue (Br. 19), certainly 
the issue in both cases are not only substantially but precisely 
the same, namelv the existence of a public road in White Pine Canyon. 
-ll-
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Because the reporter's transcript of the testimony in 
the Sullivan case has been lost (R. 419), only the abstract of 
the record on appeal (Ex. 2-P) and the brief of John Condas 
(Ex. 3-P) which are on file in this Court were available to 
respondents to prove the former testimony. Both the abstract 
and the brief contain references to the pages of the lost 
transcript from which they were prepared. 
The circumstances under which the abstract and the brief 
were prepared argue forcefully for their accuracy in reporting 
the former testimony. Both documents were prepared in an appeal 
in this Court where any misstatements by either lawyer would have 
been challenged. The documents were prepared with the lost trans-
cript in hand and they were prepared by the persons who asked 
the former questions and heard the former answers given. Finally, 
when the verbatim quotations of the testimony in the brief of 
John Condas are compared with the abstract prepared by Patrick 
Sullivan's lawyer, it can be seen that the two documents agree 
in every material respect. 
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the former 
testimony was properly received in evidence. 
II 
THE STATEMENT OF JOHN CONDAS, IN 
HIS PLEADINGS IN THE SULLIVAN CASE, 
THAT THE ROADWAY ACROSS HIS PROPERTY 
IS A PUBLIC ROAD IS ADMISSIBLE AS A 
-12-
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DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST AND AS 
A JUDICIAL ADMISSION 
The trial court received in evidence the statement in 
the answer and counterclaim of John Condas in the Sullivan case 
(Ex. 2-P), that the roadway across his property is a public road. 
The statement when made was clearly a declaration against 
the proprietary interest of John Condas for it acknowledged that 
his property was burdened with a public road. The statement also 
has the standing of a judicial admission. 
Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides for 
the admission of declarations against interest as follows 
(10) Declarations A ainst Interest. Subject to 
the limitations o except~on , a statement which the 
judge finds was made by a declarant who is unavailable 
as a witness and which was at the time of the assertion 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest * * * that t~e declarant under the 
circumstances would not have made the statement unless 
he believed it to be true; 
Appellants appear to concede that the declaration of 
a third person may be used against a party whenever privity of 
estate exists, as this Court stated in Lvman Grazing Association 
v. Smith, 24 l 2d 443,473 P. 2d 905 (1970), and that such a state-
ment by John Condas himself 1vould be admissible in this case because 
oi the privity of estate that exists between him and the appellants, 
his grantees. (Br. 15-16.) 
Appellants apparently object to the admission of the state-
ment, as a declaration against interest, only because the statement 
-13-
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was made in pleadings prepared not by John Condas but by 
his lawyer. The objection is not well founded. "[P]leadings 
shown to have been prepared or filed by counsel employed by 
a party, are primafacie regarded as authorized by him and 
entitled to be received as his admission." McCormick, Hand 
Book of the Law of Evidence, 1954, § 242, at p. 513. Wigmore 
notes that a party in litigation "speaks always through his 
pleadings", as well as through the testimony of his witnesses, 
and states that "the basis upon which may be predicated a 
discrediting inconsistency on his part includes the whole 
range of facts asserted in his pleadings and in the testimony 
relied upon by him." Wigmore On Evidence, 1904 ed., § 1048, 
at p. 1217. "That the statements of the pleading are not 
those of the party himself must be immaterial since they are those 
of his authorized attorney. * ;, * That the pleadings in prior 
causes, then, can be treated as the parties' admissions, usable 
as evidence in later causes, must be conceded . .,, * *" Wigmore, 
supra, § 1066, at pp. 1245, 1246. 
Appellants have not challenged the accuracy of the 
statements in the pleadings concerning the public road, nor 
do they even suggest that the statement in question was anything 
less than an authorized statement of John Condas' position as 
to the existence of a public road across his property. 
-14-
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Appellants take issue (Br. 14-15) with the trial court's 
language in referring to the statements in John Condas' pleadings 
as "admissions against interest" (R. 190). It is clear from 
the trial court's decision what the court meant to say. The trial 
court should not be made "an offender for a word." The appellants 
discussion (Br. 13-15) of vicarious admissions is beside the 
point. What is important here is that John Candas made a 
statement, through his lawyer in the Sullivan case, which 
was a declaration against his interest at the time it was made. 
Such a statement may properly be used against his grantees, the 
appellants, in this case. 
The statement of John Candas in his pleadings that the 
roadway over his property is a public road is also admissible 
as a judicial admission under Rule 63(7) Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which provides as follows: 
(7) Admissions by parties. As against himself a 
statement by a person who is a party to the action in 
his individual * * * capacity * * *. 
"Judicial admissions are not evidence at all, but are 
formal admissions in the pleadings in the case * * * by a party 
or his counsel lvhich have the effect of withdrawing a fact from 
issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. 
McCormick On Evidence, 2d ed., 1972, 262, at p. 630. Such ad-
missions are in the same category as a response to a request to 
admit under the rules of civil procedure. Ibid, footnote 11. 
The same authority notes, at page 636 of the cited text, "the 
-15-
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sensible view that pleadings shown to have been prepared or filed 
by counsel employed by the party, are prima facie regarded as 
authorized by him and are entitled to be received as his 
admissions. * * *" 
To the same effect are "the statements of a grantor 
of realty, made while title was ·k i< * still in h" II ~m ; such state-
ments "are receiveable as admissions against any grantee claiming 
under him. 
* * * 
It is sufficient to note that the principle is 
today fully and universally conceded. * * *" Wigmore on Evidence, 
1972, vol. IV, § 1082, at p. 210. An admission of course, is 
sufficient to support a finding of fact. Peterson v. Richards, 
73 U. 59, 272 Pac. 229 (1928) The note to Rule 63(7) contemplates 
"the admissibility of admissions * * * by those by whose state-
ments" a party "is bound." 
III 
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED 
FROM CHALLENGING THE 
PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE 
ROADWAY IN WHITE PINE CANYON 
There are several grounds for estopple against the 
appellants in this case. Each will be presented separately. 
A. Appellants are judicially estopped by the position 
taken by John Candas in the Sullivan case:--In his counterclaim 
in the Sullivan case John Candas took the position that a "public 
highway" runs "through and beyond the said lands of the defendant"· 
-16-
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his own property, and "has been used continuously by the * * * 
public generally * ,., * for more than sixty years". 
at p. 17.) 
(Ex. 2-P, 
If John Condas were alive today and the defendant in 
this lawsuit, he would be prevented by the doctrine of judicial 
estopple from taking a position different from the one he took 
in the Sullivan case. John Condas received a benefit in the first 
trial and would be estopped from changing his position to receive 
another benefit now--from playing "fast-and-loose with the 
court". Mecham v. City of Glendale, 489 P. 2d 65, 67 (Ariz. 
1971). 
It was the rule of many courts for quite some time 
that a judicial estopple could not operate where the partners 
were not the same in both cases. This position was based upon 
the view that mutuality of parties was essential to the operation 
of any estopple. See this Court's opinion in Tracy Loan and TrustCo. 
v. Openshaw In· .. Company, 102 U. 509, 132 P. 2d 388 (1942). 
The requirement of mutality has since fallen in disfavor. 
For example, in the application of the related doctrine of 
"collateral estopple", this Court has said that it is not 
necessary that the parties be the same in both cases. Richards 
v. Hodson, 26 C. 2d 113, :.85 P . .2d 1044, 10:.6 (1971). And in 
California, the requirement of mutuality of estoppel, as a limit 
to the scope of collateral estoppel, has been rejected. Teitelbaum 
Furs. lr:c "· Llor:1inion :Lr:surance Comoanv, 375 P. 2d 439 (Cal. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1962); cert den. 372 U.S. 966. In Mecham v. City of Glendale, 
supra, the Supreme Court of Arizona applied the doctrine of 
judicial estopple where mutuality of parties did not exist. 
Although appellants mention Mecham v. City of Glendale, 
supra, in their brief (p. 24), they do not appear to take 
issue with the Arizona court's holding that judicial estoppel 
does not require a mutuality of parties. Appellants offer no 
reason why they should not be held to the posisition taken 
by their grantor as to the public road across his property. 
B. Appellants are collaterally estooped from reliti-
gating the issue of a public road in White Pine Canvon:--A branch 
of the doctrine of res judicata is the principle of collateral 
estoppel which prevents the relitigating of material facts or 
issues which are essential to and were established or determined 
in a former action, Richards v. Hodson, 26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044. 
1046 (1971); Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 U.2d 51, 305 P.2d 
503, 506 (1957). It is not necessary that all parties be the 
same in the two actions. Richards, supra, at p. 1046. 
The facts found and issues determined in the Sullivan 
case which are pertinent here are those which have to do with 
the public use of the road over the defendants' lands. The 
findings of fact of the trial court in the Sullivan case which 
are pertinent here are No. 8 and 9 (Ex. 2-P, at pp. 41-43) which 
in summary, states that the use made of the road by the public 
was ''openly, notoriously, continuously, uninterruptedly, adversel~ 
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and under claim of right for more than fifty years" (Fdg. No. 9) 
"up White Pine Canyon" for "the general purposes of traffic * * * 
for all purposes for which public highways, under similar 
conditions are generally used" (Fdg. No. 8). 
It begs the point to say that the findings in the 
Sullivan case refer primarily to the Sullivan property. Of course 
they do, since this is where the trespass was charged and the 
public's use of the Candas property had been admitted. But to 
avoid the charge of trespass, John Candas had to prove the public 
character of the road over the Sullivan property and to do that 
he had to prove that the public used the road over the Sullivan 
property and on up the canyon "through and beyond" his ow'TI lands 
as well. (See paragraph 14 of his answer (Ex. 2-P at pp. 17-18)). 
If John Candas had been the only person to use the road the use 
uould have been "private" rather than "public". Without the public's 
use further up the canyon, there would have been no occasion for 
the public to use the road over the Sullivan property. The 
findings of fact as to the publ~c's use of the road were material 
to the outcome of that lawsuit and, therefore, establish the 
public character of chat use in this lawsuit. 
7hat the findings of fact were ~or rather than against 
John Candas is a distinction without a difference--it does not 
relieve his successors from the effect of cne finding. The faces 
were material facts in a lawsuit ~n which their successor was 
a part:-'. 
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IV 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES 
THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC 
ROAD ON APPELLANTS' 
PROPERTY WHILE IT WAS 
PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The evidence in this case on the public's use of the 
roadway in White Pine Canyon in the early days is of necessity 
one sided since appellants chose to confine their evidence 
to the physical condition of the roadway and its use after 
the turn of the century. Respondents' evidence consists of 
the testimony of persons who used the roadway before and after 
the turn of the century. 
The persons who testified as to the earliest public use 
of the roadway were the witnesses of John Candas in the Sullivan 
case. Portions of the abstacted former testimony of these persons 
are reproduced in the Appendix A to this brief. The testimony 
in the Sullivan case was reviewed by this Court, on Mr. Sullivan's 
appeal, in the following language (76 U. 290 Pac. at 957): 
* * * There is ample and satisfactory evidence 
to show that as early as 1873 the roadway extended 
up and down the canyon over the lands now owned 
by the plaintiffs [Sullivan] and the defendant 
[John Candas] and others, while such lands were 
a part of the public domain, and was traveled and 
used by the public generally as occasion required 
in going up and down the canyon. ,., ,., ,., 
-20-
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Before leaving this discussion of the former testimony 
from the Sullivan case, it should be stated that at no time 
during the trial did appellants proffer any evidence from the 
Sullivan case. The trial of this case commenced on March 21, 1977, 
and concluded ten days later on March 21, 1977. Thereafter counsel 
for both parties appeared before the trial court in oral 
argument on April 13, 1977 and again on October 28, 1977, after 
the trial court's decision, in argument on the findings of fact, 
conclusions o: law and decree. Counsel for appellants never 
asked the trial court at any time to consider anything from the 
Sullivan case which was not already before it. 
Respondents offered additional evidence on the public 
road from other persons, still living, who were in the canyon in 
their early years. James Archibald. in his deposition, told of 
his travel in the canyon in 1898 with his father and a logging 
crew who brought logs out of the canyon with teams of horses as 
often as three times a day every day when it .,.;asn't storming. 
Xr. Archibald also told of his travel in the canyon in l90J and 
from 1905 to 1907. (S.. 479. deposition. ?P· 5-6. 8, 10.) Douglas 
Archibald. Earl Johnson, Gilbert ~imbal: and Soencer Young 
testified of tneir travel in :he canvon in the vears between 
l905 to 19.:'4. (?. -..75. Earl Johnson depositiLn, ;:>p. J. 7-8. 
437, 443-447. -..54, -..57. 459, -..ol. -..oJ. -..o/. -..70.) 
~estiDony o~ the ?ublic 1 s use of the road~dv ~~hile 
John ConJ.1s ~;3s ali~·e ~as ~i\'etl b·.· F~~J ~rc\m~nc ~;~ 0 \;or~~~ 
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for John Candas off and on from 1925 to 1930 and lived on the 
property for six months in 1926. Mr. Browning testified in his 
deposition that he observed people going up and down the road on 
horses and in wagons, pickup trucks and cars. He also testified 
that John Candas had said to him that people could not be stopped 
from using the road because it had been a public road for too 
many years. (R. 483, 486, 489-495.) 
In the opinion of the trial court, respondents "produced 
additional credible evidence during the trial to corroborate the 
evidence contained in the transcripts of Sullivan, and further 
substantiate the findings of the trial judge in Sullivan." 
(R. 189,191.) 
Appellants, on the other hand, offered no evidence on 
the existence or nonexistence of the roadway while their property 
was a part of the public domain. No attempt was made by them to 
disprove the former testimony or this Court's conclusion, based 
on that and additional testimony, of the existence of the public 
road before John Candas came to White Pine Canyon. It would not 
be an overstatement to say, paraphrazing this Court's opinion 
in the Sullivan case, that there is ample, satisfactory and 
unchallenged evidence that a public road existed over the 
appellants' property while it was part of the public domain. 
v 
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY IS SUBJECT 
TO THE PUBLIC ROAD IN WHITE PINE 
CANYON 
-22-
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Pursuant to federal law the public is granted a right 
of way over the public domain. The grant is contained in 
§ 2477 of the Revised Statutes of the United States and is quoted, 
supra, at page 3. This Court had occasion to review the 
federal grant and the related state statute, V.C.A. § 27-12-89, 
supra. at p. 3, in its opinion in the Sullivan case where it 
was held that when federal land patents are issued for lands 
on which public roads have been established, the patents are 
issued subject to such roads and the persons who accept the 
patents take the lands subject to the public's rights in 
those lands. Sullivan v. Condas, 76 U. 585, 290 Pac. at 957 
(1928). In the language of the Sullivan opinion, 
* * * The patent to the land issued to the pre-
decessors in interest of the plaintiffs [Sullivan] 
in 1906 about the thirty-three years * * * [after 
the roadway came into existence]. Plaintiffs 
acquired their interest in the lands in 1922 or 
1924. The right of way ~aving been established 
over public lands by public user, the predecessors 
of the plaintiffs when t~e patent was issued to 
them, and the plaintiffs when they acquired their 
interest in and to the lands, took them subject 
to the easement in favor of the public. unless 
it was thereafter extenguished bv operation of 
the state law, which was not done. * * * 
The trial court in this case determined that the 
action of the SLL'ilillit Count:: co=issioner~ in 3.ttec.Jptin~ to 
vacate the public road was null and void f2r lack of notice. 
Appellants do not challenge that determination. This Court 
said in Sullivan that a public road \:co Pac. at os;1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"when once established must continue to be a 
highway until abandoned ~y order of th~ boa:d 
of county commissioners ~n the county ~n wh~ch 
it is located or by a judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction." 
Section 27-12-90 of the Utah Code, which is now in 
effect, quoted, supra, page 3, is clear. 
All public highways once established shall 
continue to be highways until abandoned or 
vacated * 1< * by * * * competent authority 
Appellants have offered no legal reason why the trial 
court should not have applied the law of the Sullivan case and 
U.C.A. § 27-12-90 to this case, When the law of Sullivan and 
the statute are applied to this case, the result is that the 
White Pine Canyon Road was a public road before appellants came 
to the canyon and has remained a public road since that time. 
VI 
APPELLANTS' HISTORY OF THE 
ROADWAY IN WHITE PINE CANYON 
AFTER THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
IS IRRELEVANT AJ.'W INCOMPLETE 
Respondents are reluctant to go into a lengthy dis-
cussion of the evidence, theirs and appellants', as to the 
public's use of the roadway after it had become established 
as a public road for the reason that to do so might be taken 
as a concession that such evidence is relevant. No such con-
cession is intended. But re d t d · h f span en s o Wls to re er briefly 
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to a number of inconsistencies and omissions in the rather 
lengthy but one-sided discussion of the history of the canyon 
after the turn of the century. 
A. The former testimony of deceased witnesses has 
been ignored:--The discussion of respondents' evidence (Br. 28-30) 
omits any mention of the five witnesses who testified to the 
earliest public use of the road in the Sullivan trial. One of 
those witnesses was appellants' predecessor in interest, Delbert 
Redden, who testified, "To my personal knowledge, a wagon road 
extended above the Candas house up White Pine Canyon clear to 
the top. It was always there*** while I lived there." (Ex. 
2-P, pp. 100-101 quoted in Appendix A.) To say that "plaintiff's 
own evidence" is contrarv to the findings of fact (Br. 30) is a 
total misstatement. 
B. The documents have been misused·--Appellants 
refer to maps, survey notes and homestead papers (Br. 30-32) 
as establishing a "very clear inference" (Er. 31) that a "trail" 
rather than a road existed in the canyon. One has to bear in 
mind that when appellants speak of a road or a trail they do 
not have "use" in mind. They. are talking about '\.;idth" and 
to them anything less than eight or ten feet in wi~th is a 
trail (R. 309-910, 3So.) Eie;l~t or ten :ee::. of .:curse. is arr.ple 
width for the ~orses and later the wagons . .::ars and trucks 
which were to travel in the canvon. (F~;. 5. A~p~~dix C. 
infra. C~ris Cond~s. one of :~e a~pe~~a~:s. testified that 
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the old wagons were only five feet wide. (R. 810.) The earliest 
government map, prepared in 1901, shows '1 "trail". (Ex. 31-D.) 
Someone must have been using the canyon before that time. 
No evidence was offered to show what was intended by 
the statements on the homestead documents. (Br. 31-32.) Certainlv 
they were not intended to mean that no road existed in the 
canyon since not only Pete Condas but also John Condas and 
Delbert Redden made such statements (Br. 32; Exs. 33-D, 34-D, 
and 35-D) and both John Condas, by his pleadings, and Delbert 
Redden, by his testimony, took the position in the Sullivan case 
that a public road existed over their property. Moreover 
the homestead papers for Pete Condas and also his brother Gust 
were prepared by John Condas. (R. 553-554.) 
C. The issue is not whether a public road was estab-
lished across private property by public user:--Appellants dis-
cussion of the physical condition of the road and its use in 
later years (Br. 32-40) is intended to support the argument that 
the public did not acquire an interest in appellants' property 
by public user (Br. 40). This is a "smokescreen" to attempt 
to obscure the real point in issue which is public user before 
the property was acquired from the public domain. Appellants 
have ignored the fifty years of public use before John Condas 
purchased the Redden place. 
There is a conflict in the testimony as to physical 
condition of the road at various times from the 1920's on. 
-26-
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Physical condition varies with intensity of use. It does not 
establish the absence of prior public rights. Without going into 
great detail, we would mention one part of the evidence on the 
physical condition of the road which appellants have ignored. 
Mr. David Street was the driver who took a caterpillar tractor 
up the road before appellants claim they made a "passable road" 
(Br. 33-34, R. 692.) Mr. Street therefore, saw the condition 
of the road before appellants claimed to have made it. Judge 
Ballif saw the road afterwards at the commencement of the 
trial. A film was taken of the road about the time Judge Ballif 
saw the road and that film was shown during the trial so that 
both Judge Ballif and Mr. Street could see it. Mr. Street 
then testified that the road he saw in the film was substantially 
the same road he had travelled, that he recalled very point 
along the road and that ~e did not have to use his blade when 
he drove a caterpillar up the road. (R. 1065, 1068-1069.) Mr. 
Street further explained that he knew, from his experience, that 
the road he travelled had not been made by a cater?illar 
because of "these little jigs" in the road. "There 1•ouLi 
be more straight stretches. ***Because t~ere wouldn't 
be no object in dodging around the little p0ints like this 
to get any·..:here." (R. ~065.) 
D. Gates and si2ns do not Jestrov a ~ublic road --
To be sur~. af:er winning his lawsuit with Patrick Sullivan. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
John Condas put up fences and signs to obstruct public use. 
Appellants argument that such action "is incompatible with the 
requisite intentions of John G. Condas or his successors (them-
selves] to abandon the roadway to the public use" is again beside 
the point. (Br. 41.) Patrick Sullivan had also put up gates 
and he too made a point of it in his appeal. This Court 
responded to Mr. Sullivan as follows (290 Pac. at 957): 
A further point is made that gates were put 
up by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
interest, thereby indicating that the character 
of the roadway was a private roadway and interrupted 
the use of it. But there is ample evidence to 
show that whatever gates or fences were put up 
were erected after the roadway had for many years 
been established and used as a public highway by 
the public generally and by those who had occasion 
to use it and was so continued to be used after 
as before whatever gates or fences were erected. 
The teaching of Sullivan is that private parties can-
not destroy public rights in an already established public 
road by gates and signs. No contrary authority has been cited 
by appellants. 
There is no "irreconcilable" conflict in the trial 
courts' findings, as appellants argue. (Br. 42.) The existence 
of gates and private interference with public travel after 1924 
do not a private road make out of a public road that came into 
existence in 1873. Appellants cite no authority for the pro-
position that private interference with public travel can 
achieve such a result. Actually, as the evidence showed, the 
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wooden gates were not an obstruction to public travel. The 
trial court found that "the public continued to use the roadway 
until it was closed by the defendants in 1971" (Fdg. 4) when 
"defendants placed iron gates across the roadway" as a result 
of which the public including appellants was ''denied free travel 
along said road" (Fdg. 15). 
The point of all of this is that no amount of wrongful 
conduct--in total disregard of the rights of others and of the 
law--can destroy the public road. Whatever John Condas and the 
appellants have done over the years to obstruct public travel 
over the road was no more lawful than the actions of Patrick 
Sullivan years before. Appellants cannot prevail on such 
conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Claron C. Spencer 
Attorney for appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing brief was 
mailed to the counsel for appellants this 7th dav of 
September, 1978. 
C aron C Spencer 
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APPENDIX A 
Selected portions of the abstract of the testimony of 
persons who testified on behalf of John Condas in Sullivan v. 
Condas relating to the public's use of the roadway in White Pine 
Canyon are set out below. The page references are to the Abstract 
in Sullivan v. Condas which is plaintiffs' Exhibit 2-P in this 
case. 
MR. WILLim~ ARCHIBALD: 
Page 70: 
* * * I have known White Pine and Red Pine 
Canyons since about 1870. I know the Sullivan 
ranch and the Condas =anch. They are both sit-
uated in the mouth of White Pine Canyon. Sulli-
van's ranch is do~n north of Condas' ranch. Land 
north belongs to me. I join thE Sullivan ranch 
on the north with 99.3 acres. 
* * * 
There is a roadway leading from the Park Citv 
highway up to plaintiffs', t~at is up to Sullivan's 
and Condas' ranches. It starts dov.n ·...rhat •..:e call 
the Trottman residence and parallels the section 
line until i: gets 1,;i:::hin about ..'0 rods of the tol,n-
ship corner, ~here it turns souchwest into Sullivan's 
place anci crosses the corner of mv land. It chen 
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runs along pretty close to the foot of the bench, up 
past what is now the Sullivan house and runs on up 
there to the Condas ranch. It goes right up White 
Pine Canyon into the basin. 
Pages 71-72 : 
Q. How long have you known, to your own knowl-
edge has there been a roadway leading up along in a 
general way the present course of the road which we 
saw yesterday? 
(Objection) 
Since 1873. For hauling lumber, for driving 
livestock up in the hills, and for hauling wood and 
general building material for the settlement in 
shape of timber. This road has been used generally 
by the public for those purposes during that entire 
period. The road has run in the direction of the 
present road. * * * While I hve known this road 
it has been well defined and a well traveled road. 
Thereis no means of ingress and egress to White 
Pine canyon other than along the course of this 
road. * * * 
Pages 74-75: 
On cross examination the witness Archibald testified as follows· 
* * * There is no possibility of automobile travel 
beyond the Candas place. There was a good road 
above the Candas place when we were logging. In 
1903. The road there was used for logging clear 
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Page 76: 
Page 79: 
the Salt Lake County line. The logging ceased in 
1903-1906. The logs were cut up by the sawmill 
right on this flat, just in front of that little 
hollow that runs up this side of Mr. Sullivan's 
house, and on the Sullivan tract. At that time 
the purpose of the road was for hauling wood and 
lumber, and driving cattle up into White Pine 
basin and ~cDonald basins and over to Dutch basins. 
\~e could drive our cattle over any part of the 
country most practicable. There were no fences. 
They done that. Swif's sawmill was in Robinson 
hollow about a mile above the Condas house.* * * 
During the time the upper mill was operating there 
was quite a little trafic up and down the canyon, 
hauling lumber. 
* * *I know of lots of sheep driven back and forth 
for eight or ten years. In the early days cattle 
and some sheep driven, some horses. * * * 
This road that runs up to the Sullivan's ranch 
and thence up into Condas ranch ~as ~he main tra-
veled road. The old trail was merelv a little trail. 
The farmers generally furnished wood to the 
mills for roasting ores until close to 1900. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This White Pine road passes up thru my land, 
not very much maybe 50, 75 or 100 feet. No inter-
ference with the use of this road or any obstruction 
until Mr. Sullivan got up there. The White Pine 
Canyon road is well defined. If people had any 
business in there that is the road they took. 
White Pine canyon is 3 miles in length, White 
Pine canyon is not precipitious or steep. A good 
many mining claims located in that section.* * * 
* * * 
THOMAS L. POWERS, a witness for defendant, being sworn, on direct 
examination testified as follows: 
Page 81: 
Page 83: 
***I have know White Pine canyon for 35 years. 
I have dealt some in livestock, not very largely. 
I know the White Pine canyon road. I drove cattle 
in there 33 years ago. Anybody who wanted to go up 
there used the road. Since I have known the road it 
has been used just to haul some timbers out and to 
drive livestock back and forth, to haul logs and 
fence poles. It has been used by the public since 
I've know it, continuously. 
* * * It was a beaten road for a wagon. There was 
no occasion for people to travel it except to get 
out logs and fence posts. I haven't driven cattle in 
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the canyon since Redden homsteaded. Eleven or 
thirteen years. I started driving cattle there 
about 1896. I drove the last about 1912 or 
1914. During that time no timber, but some logs 
were hauled down to Snyderville, some to Park City. 
The road went as far up as Iron Meadow and White 
Pine meadow, later in 1912.* * * 
Pages 84-85: 
DAVE SNYDER, being sworn, testified for defendant as follows: 
On direct examination: 
Page 87: 
I live at Snyderville and farm as a business. 
I have lived there 61 years. Also in the livestock 
business. I am 61 years old. I have known Red Pine 
and White Pine canyons practically all my life. 
There is a road leading up White Pine canyon. It 
has been there ever since I can remember. It has 
been used by the public since I have known it for 
hauling wood, driving stock, hauling logs and mining 
timbers and cordwood.* * * 
* * o'< Twenty- five years ago I hauled ·.-ood and logs 
over the road above the Condas land. All of the 
land was then under the government. 
Pages 88-89 
R.J. BAILEY, a witness for defendant, on direct examination, 
testified as follows 
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Page 90: 
I am 64 years old. I reside at Mill Creek. 
Have resided there 64 years. I am a sheep raiser. 
I have known White Pine canyon 26 or 27 years. 
When I first became acquainted with it there was 
a fair trail, fair road for a wagon up that canyon. 
I don't know the Lake and Redden places. They didn't 
own it when I went through there. About 24 years 
ago I first took sheep through there. We went up 
Trottman's Lane, turned to the left, then during that 
period we went up that canyon in June of each year, 
and out in the fall. Went up and down the canyon 
frequently with a cart--the front wheels of a wagon--
for supplies and hay for the sheep. For eight or 
nine years. Quite a while ago. Along about 18 or 
19 years ago. My last trip in there was in 1919. 
* * * 
"Q.--And was there a well defined road during 
that period you went up with your sheep? A.--Yes, 
I could get along." The road was 2 to 3 rods wide. 
We were never interferred with. I know other sheep 
men that trailed sheep up that canyon. Others 
trailed their sheep up that road.,, * * 
* * * In 1919 I come down on horseback. "Q. --Now, 
the Sullivan place was taken up before that?" A.--
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Page 94: 
I just rode by. I didn't inquire who owned it. 
The boy took the sheep up there. I took my cart 
right up to the Western Monitor mine, the head of 
Iron canyon. 
About five miles. It was a public highway. 
Its destination--the Western Monitor mine in Iron 
canyon at the head. You can go up that road if 
you want to. In 1919 you could go up with a 
cart, not a car. We could have done the same in 
1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917. I cannot recall when 
we last went up there with a wagon as described. 
DELBERT H. REDDEN, for defendant, testified, on direct examination, 
as follows: 
I live at Park City, I have lived there about 
30 years. I have been acquainted with wnite Pine 
Canyon since about 1900. Since then there has al-
ways been a road leading up White Pine Canyon. 
* * '" 
Since my acquaintance with it, this highway, it 
has bee~ used for hauling logs, timbers and poles, 
and b:.· stockmen and sheepmen, mvself i::~cluded. 
Page~ 97-98: 
*In l92l I got $500 worth of timber in the right 
hand fork of ' . .Jhite Pine, anJ hauleJ them to the Dalv 
JuJge mine. 
· Above the ranch •.,nice Pine canyon 
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Page 99: 
is used generally for cattle and sheep grazing; 
mostly sheep and White Pine canyon road is the 
only way, the only access. (This last over objection 
and exception). Since I have been up there that 
canyon has been used by the public and private 
persons for grazing livestock. (This over objection 
and exception). In my grazing of the White Pine 
territory the livestock was trailed up and down the 
bottom of the canyon. (This over objection and 
exception). With reference to the bottom of the 
canyon the road runs right through the Sullivan and 
Condas places and down Trottman Lane to the county 
road.*** 
* * *At that time there was a traveled wagon road 
up White Pine canyon above my homestead, the present 
Condas place.*** 
Pages 100-101: 
Above 1918 or '19 I should say there was a wagon 
road on the right hand side of the canyon about half 
a mile above Condas house and also an old road in 
the canyon. "Q.--You mean in the bottom, above the 
Condas house? A.--All the way up the canyon. Q. --
So, if I understand it, you say in 1918 there was a 
wagon road extending above the Condas house, White 
Pine Canyon, about half a mile? A.--Above the house." 
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The old road continued up the bottom. To my personal 
knowledge, a wagon road extended above the Condas 
house up '~ite Pine Canyon clear to the top. It 
was always there. The old road from the Condas house 
to the top of White Pine Canyon. It was always there 
while I lived there. I don't know if it is there now. 
It extended about five miles above the Condas ranch 
to the Western ~lonitor mine. It did when I was last 
there in 1923. 
Pages 102-103. 
* * * I know of no factories or settlements up there. 
Hunters and fishers, sheeprnen and cattlemen came di-
rect to my place and they go to the tops of the 
mountains, sometimes with their fishing tackle, guns, 
cattle and sheep, I would call the canyon to the 
tops of mountains public highways. ***I suppose 
there •was a public thoroughfare from \,'hite Pine 
Canvon over to Brighton. i: was used. I • ..;ant the 
record to show that there was a public thoroughfare 
from :oihite Pine can::on to Bri,;::ton. 
Archibald, Powers, Johnson, all o: ~v nei~hbors 
hauleJ wooJ. posts, poles out anJ drove cat:le up 
anJ uo'~Tt '>•r.i:e P:.ne can::on JGrins 1.:30::3 :o lc.l08. l>hile 
I lived in SnvJerville. 
-)<)-
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APPENDIX B 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This cause came on regularly for trial before the court, 
sitting without a jury, upon the complaint of the plaintiffs, 
Claron C. Spencer, and Richard G. Allen of Senior and Senior 
appeared for the plaintiffs. Joseph Novak Appeared for the 
defendants. Evidence was introduced by the respective parties 
and considered by the court, and the court being fully advised in 
the premises and having found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against the defendants, makes the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are the owners of the following described 
lands in the White Pine Canyon area of Summit County, Utah: 
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLM 
Section 12: 
Section 13: 
Section 14: 
Lot 4, Wl/2SEl/4, SWl/4 
Wl/2NW1/4 
NEl/4NEl/4, Wl/2NE1/4, NWl/4 
2. The defendants are the owners of the following des-
cribed lands in the White Pine Canyon area of Sumit County, Utah· 
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SUI 
Section 1: 
Section 12: 
Section 13: 
Lots 9, 10, 13, 14, 
Wl/2SE1/4 
Lots l, 2, 3, Wl/2NEl/4 
Lot l 
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3. There is a roadway, passing up White Pine Canyon 
through and beyond the above-described lands of the defendants 
and the plaintiffs to the public domain. Said roadway is a 
public road and has been used by the plaintiffs and the defendants 
and their predecessors in interest and by the public generally 
since 1873. 
4. The public's use of said roadway for more than 
fifty years prior to 1928 was for the general purpose of traffic 
including the hauling and transportation of logs, firewood, 
lumber, mining timber, supplies for mining operations, for the 
trailing of livestock including cattle, sheep and horses, and 
for all purposes for which public highways under similar conditions 
were then ~sed. The public continued to use the roadway until it 
was closed by the defendants in 1971. 
5. The uses made by said roadwav were on foot, by 
horseback. in hore draw~ wagons and in trucks and cars. 
6. In the case of Sullivan v. Candas. which was filled 
in the Third Judicial Court in and for Summit County, Civil No. 
42140, and decided in 1928, defendants' grantor. John G. Candas, 
alleged in his Ar:lended .:..r.s1,rer ~:-.a.::: there 1,ras and had been for 
sixty vears a '·"ell tra•;eled road up '.-ihi:::e Pine Canvon through 
and bevond the defendants' lanes and that ~he road had been 
used as a public road by the oublic ~enerallv for ~ore than 60 
:;ears. 
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7. The district court in Sullivan v. Condas case 
found that the roadway up White Pine Canyon was a public road 
and had been used by the public openly, notoriously, continuously, 
uninterruptedly, adversely and under claim of right as a public 
road since 1873. The court also found that said roadway imme-
diately north of defendants' property was 3 rods in width 
"and that said witdth has been and is necessary in the enjoyment 
of said roadway for the purposes for which it has been used and 
is now being used by the public generally and by the 'defendants' 
'grantor' and his predecessors in interest". The width of said 
roadway, through the defendants' lands, is a minimum sufficient 
to accommodate a motor vehicle of the size of a three-quarter 
ton pickup truck and a maximum of two rods. 
8. Defendants offered no evidence to show that the 
road up White Pine Canyon through the lands now owned by them 
was not a public road from 1873 to 1924 as alleged by their 
grantor and as found to be fact in the case of Sullivan v. 
Condas. 
9. During the years 1925 to 1928, John G. Condas, 
predecessor in interest of defendants, constructed a series 
of fences and gates within the northerly portion of his propert:; 
dividing the same into several pastures and corral areas which 
included a wooden gate across the roadway entering his propert:1 
on the north line thereof and a series of division fences and 
wire gates along the roadway through his pasture and corral 
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areas and a wooden gate of only sufficient width to permit 
passage of a person riding horseback across the roadway near 
the southerly end of his pasture area. 
10. The wooden gate and its replacements constructed 
across the roadway on the north line of the John G. Candas pro-
perty was usually maintained in a closed and locked condition, 
whenever John G. Candas and his successors were away from the 
property. generally since the construction thereof until the 
present time and was generally maintained in a closed but unlocked 
condition when they were present on the property and said gates 
were generally posted with "keep out" or "no trespassing" signs 
since the construction thereof until the present time. 
ll. During the period of 1926 to 1932, inclusive, 
entry upon and use of the roadway up ~Tiite Pine Canyon across 
defendants' property by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was 
with the pe~.ission and consent of defendants' predecessor in 
interest who provided a key to the locked gate to plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest. 
12. During the period from 1933 to 1970, inclusive, 
plaintiffs and/or their predecessor in interest. leased their 
land to defendants' predecessor in interest and/or defendants 
or the la~ds of both parties ~ere ~ointlv leased to third persons 
and all during said period che entry upon and use of the roadwav 
up white Pine Cc1n:;on across detencants' propert:' bv plaintiffs 
and their predecessor in interest ~as ~ith the consent and 
pe~miss1on ·Jf de~en~ants 3n~ or :~~i~ ?r~~eces5or in interest. 
- ·-+ ~-
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13. Notwithstanding the foregoing findings 9, 10, 
11 and 12, the use of the roadway by plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in interest, and within the times limited in 
said Findings, was under a claim of right and not in recognition 
of defendants' claimed right to grant or deny permission to 
use same. 
14. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding 
that the use of the roadway up White Pine Canyon across defendants' 
property by plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest was 
continuous, open and adverse under a claim of riht for a period 
of 20 years or that plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest 
established a prescriptive right of passage over the roadway up 
White Pine Canyon across defendants' property. 
15. In 1971, he defendants placed iron gates across 
the roadway up White Pine Canyon and have maintained the gates 
so that the plaintiffs are barred from entrance to their lands 
either from the north or south along said roadway. The public 
generally is denied free travel along said road. 
16. In 1972, defendants petitioned the Board of 
County Commissioners of Summit County to vacate a portion of 
the roadway as a public road where it passes through defendants' 
lands in Section 1. 
17. Pursuant to defendants' petition and upon 
representations by the defendants that no one but he defendants 
used the road, the Board of County Commissioners enacted Ordin-
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ance No. 63 on September 6, 1972, as corrected by amended 
Ordinance No. 67, which purported to vacate the public roadway 
through a portion of defendants' land. 
18. The Board of County Commissioners for Summit 
County did not give notice of the vacation to the plaintiffs 
in this action, nor did they publish notice of the vacation 
prior to enacting the vacating ordinance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The roadway which passes up White Pine Canyon 
through and beyond the lands of the defendants and the plaintiffs 
is a public road. 
2. The defendants are estopped from denying that 
said roadway is a public road. 
3. The said roadway may be maintained by the plaintiffs 
and the public generally through the defendants' lands to a 
minimum width sufficient to accommodate a motor vehicle the 
size of a three-quarter ton pickup truck and to a maximum width 
of two rods as may be necessary to provide for the convenient 
and safe use of the public in the light of present and future 
modes of transportation. 
4. Said public road has not been abandoned or vacated 
by competent public authorit:'· The action of the Summit Countv 
Commission in 1972 in attempting to vacate a ;:JOri t ion of said 
public road ~ .. ~as anullitv anJ Surr.rnit Countv Ordinance :.:o. 63, 
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dated September 6, 1972, as corrected by Amended Ordinance 
No. 67, insofar as it purports to vacate a portion of the 
public road through defendants' property is null and void. 
5. That plaintiffs have failed to establish the 
existence of a prescriptive easement over the defendants' 
property as alleged in their pleadings. The plaintiffs are 
entitled to their costs in this proceeding. 
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APPENDIX C 
DECREE 
The court being fully advised in the premises, having 
found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendants, and having made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. That the existing roadway up White Pine Canyon 
in Summit County, Utah, as it passes through and beyond the 
following described lands of the defendants 
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLM 
Section 1: 
Section 12: 
Section 13: 
is a public road. 
Lots 9 . 10 , 13 
14, Wl/2SEl/ 4 
Lots 1, 2. 3, 
Wl/ 2~wl/ 4 
Lot 1 
2. That the plaintiffs, their agents. representatives, 
employees and successors in interest and the public generally 
have the right to use said roadway as a public road free of 
interference from the defendants, thei~ agents, employees and 
successors in interest. 
3. That the defendants shall forthwith remove the 
gates which they have erected across said roadwav. 
4. That the ?laintiffs and the public generally mav 
maintain said roam.;ay throm;h defendants' lands to minimum width 
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sufficient to accommodate a motor vehicle the size of a 
three-quarter ton pickup and to a maximum width of two rods, 
as may be necessaiy to provide for the convenient and safe 
use of the public in the light of present and future modes of 
transportation. 
5. That the defendants and each of them, their 
agents, representatives, employees and successors in interest 
are premanently enjoined from interfering with or in any manner 
obstructing, either directly or indirectly, the use, occupancy 
and enjoyment of said roadway by the plaintiffs, their agents, 
representatives, employees and successors in interest and by 
the public generally through the said lands of the defendants. 
6. That the plaintiffs recover their costs of this 
action. 
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